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This study empirically examines the pattern of domestic investment that is consistent with
a neoclassical supply-side model of the Nigerian economy. The estimations are carried out
with time-series data from 1970 to 2006 using the Johansen estimation techniques. The results
conform to the ﬁndings of existing literature that real output, user cost of capital, and the level
of ﬁnancial development are signiﬁcant determinants of domestic investment in Nigeria. The
distinctive feature of the study is the signiﬁcant role played by governance in explaining the long-
term pattern of domestic investment in Nigeria. The results from the long-run estimation and
the impulse responses revealed that a well-structured and stable socio-economic environment
will boost domestic investment over the long run. Therefore, in modelling domestic investment
for Nigeria, it is imperative to incorporate the signiﬁcant role played by governance.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Empirical evidence has revealed that investment is one of the major determinants of sustainable
long-term economic growth. In recent years, there has been mounting debate about the importance
of domestic investment to economic development especially in developing economies. According
to OECD: 2001, a country’s economic performance over time is determined to a large extent by
its governance performances (i.e. political, institutional, and legal environment). It is generally
accepted that long-term economic growth of a country will lead to a signiﬁcant improvement in the
standard of living of its citizens. A reduction in the widespread poverty which is a major feature of
the Nigeria economy can be achieved through a sustained increase in domestic investment.
A closer look at the pattern of domestic investment in Nigeria is imperative in order to be able
to achieve sustained growth. Over the years, the Nigerian economy has gone through periods of
economic and political instability, which have hindered domestic investment into the country. The
stability of a country’s socio-economic and political system reﬂects the soundness of its level of
governance and this is seen as a major factor in decision-making by investors.
The role of good governance in growth has been a central debate among global policy makers
in recent years. The major stumbling block to the implementation of many macroeconomic policies
in the developing and low-income economies has been the absence of the political ‘will’ imbedded
within the leadership structure. The extent to which a country’s governance can impact on the socio-
economic environment and productive capacity cannot be underestimated (Globerman & Shapiro,
2002).
The concept of governance as used in this study consists of the traditions and institutions by
which the authority of a country is being exercised (WGI, 2008). This includes the eﬀectiveness
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1of government in formulating and implementing sound policies, the respect for the rule of law, the
state of the institutions that govern against corrupt practices, and the stability of the political
environment. These elements of governance will aﬀect the investment decisions of ﬁrms directly.
This study, however, augments the existing literature on the determinants of domestic investment
in the context of the Nigerian economy. It investigates the important role of the political environment
in explaining long-term domestic investment in Nigeria.
The rest of the study is organised as follows; Section 2 presents some stylised facts on the evo-
lution of domestic investment in Nigeria. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, which contains
the background on the existing related literature, theoretical framework, methodology and the de-
scription of the data used in the study. It also presents the estimation results. Section 4 concludes
the study.
2S t y l i s e d F a c t s
This section presents the evolution of domestic investment in Nigeria since 1970. A few basic trends
have emerged over the past few years with regards to the pattern of growth in domestic investment
and the ratio of domestic investment to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Figure 1, shows the growth in domestic investment and investment as a ratio of GDP in Nigeria.
The average growth rate of domestic investment since 1970 is about 11 percent, while GDP grew
by about 7 percent over the same period. This resulted in a higher investment-GDP ratio on the
average of about 20 percent due to the denominator eﬀects of GDP.
Though highly unstable, growth in domestic investment was positive over most of the period
since 1970. Between 1970 and 1977, domestic investment grew by about 41 percent on average,
reaching a record high of about 118 percent in 1973. Growth averaged about 23 percent between
1985 and 1993. The highly unstable pattern of growth in domestic investment in Nigeria can be
attributed to the volatile economic and political environment in the country (Globerman & Shapiro;
2002). Therefore, in modelling investment in Nigeria, it is necessary to incorporate the signiﬁcant
role of good governance.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Background
There is a large body of literature that has modelled the investment behaviour of countries across
the world. These studies have adopted various investment models such as the accelerator model, the
cash-ﬂow model, Tobin’s Q model; and the neoclassical model (Jorgenson approach), which diﬀer
according to the various assumptions on which the models rest. The important role of governance
in determining the level of investment is, however, under-explored in the literature. Most studies on
the determinants of investment (i.e. Shaﬁk (1992), Oshikoya (1994), Ghura and Goodwin (2000),
Ndikumana (2000), Du Toit and Moolman (2004), and Bayraktar and Fofack (2007)) have focused
on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables while ignoring the role played by policy and institution.
An empirical model of private investment that takes into account the major features of a develop-
ing country is investigated in Shaﬁk (1992). Using the cointegration and error-correction techniques
under a neoclassical framework of proﬁt-maximising and cost-minimising behaviour of ﬁrms, the
results suggest that mark-up prices, internal ﬁnancing of ﬁrms and the cost of investment goods are
the major determinants of private investment in Egypt.
The important role played by macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables as determinants of domestic
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is investigated by Oshikoya (1994) and Ndikumana (2000).
Evidence from their panel data estimates shows a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between do-
mestic investment and the various indicators of ﬁnancial development and macroeconomic variables.
2Similar results were found in Ghura and Goodwin (2000) who investigate the determinants of private
investment in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa? and Latin America.
Bayraktar and Fofack (2007) derive a formal speciﬁcation of a private investment function in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Using the Tobin’s Q theory and the neoclassical theory of investment, their
results point to the signiﬁcant role played by aggregate proﬁtability shock, and by the ﬁnancing of
investment in determining the level of private investment in Africa.
Du Toit and Moolman (2004) estimate the investment function that is consistent with the neo-
classical supply-side model of the South African economy and which allows for proﬁt-maximising
and cost-minimising decision making by ﬁrms. Their ﬁndings reveal the role played by internal and
external ﬁnancial constraints on investment in South Africa. This has been attributed to the various
impositions of international sanctions against the country over the years.
Against this background, it is necessary to investigate further other non-macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial variables that have been aﬀecting domestic investment in a typical developing-country con-
text. The importance of the country-speciﬁc institutional and political environment as a determining
factor in explaining investment has been explored in Altomonte (2000), Bevan and Estrin (2000),
and Mody and Srinivasan (1998). Most relevant to this study is the analysis in Globerman and
Shapiro (2002), which investigates how governance aﬀects foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows in
developed and developing economies. Poor governance that is reﬂected in the unstable political en-
vironment in most African countries has been a major hindrance to increasing domestic investment
over the years. Following the ideas in Globerman and Shapiro (2002), this study investigates the
role of governance in determining domestic investment in Nigeria over the period 1970 to 2006.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
The aggregate capital stock at the end of period t is referred to as the net capital stock. A constant
depreciation rate (δ) is assumed. This is expressed as:
Kt =( 1− δ)Kt−1 + It (1)
Where KtandKt−1 are the capital stock in the current and previous period respectively, δ is the
rate of depreciation and It is the gross investment. δKt−1 is the replacement investment, and
net investment (Kt − Kt−1) equals total investment minus replacement investment (It − δKt−1).
Therefore, the following identity holds for gross investment:
Gross investment = replacement investment + net investment
The theories of investment behaviour mostly relate the demand for new plant and equipment to
the gap between the desired or optimal amount of capital and the actual amount of capital (Du Toit,
1999:81). Combining these two aspects of investment behaviour, gross investment can be written
as:
It = λt(K∗
t − Kt−1)+δKt−1 = λtK∗
t +( δ − λt)Kt−1. (2)
Where λt is the speed of adjustment between K∗
t and Kt−1,a n dK∗
t is the desired or optimal capital
at the end of the current time period (see Du Toit, 1999:81 for detailed exposition).
As mention earlier, diﬀerent approaches such as the Keynesian model, the cash-ﬂow model,
and the neoclassical model (Jorgenson; 1963 approach) have been used in modelling investment
behaviour. The neoclassical model is the most commonly adopted approach in the literature (i.e.
Du Toit, 1999; Du Toit and Moolman, 2004; and Pretorius, 1998) in explaining investment decisions
of ﬁrms. The model is built on the strict assumption that ﬁrms maximise proﬁts in a perfectly
competitive environment. This study considers an augmented neoclassical approach to be the most
suitable approach in estimating the domestic investment function for Nigeria: Unlike the purely
neoclassical model, it incorporates institutional characteristics. Therefore, institutional factors such
as governance are treated as part of ﬁrms’ optimisation problem when making investment decisions.
The link between investment and capital stock can be captured empirically either by estimating
capital stock and deriving investment subsequently, or estimating investment and the subsequent
3derivation of capital stock (Du Toit, 1999: 91). This study estimates domestic investment, and
augments long-run domestic investment in Nigeria with some form of governance indicator, which is
modelled together with the level of output, user cost of capital and ﬁnancial constraint (a measure














Where lninvt is the natural logarithm of domestic investment in Nigeria; lnrgdpt is the natural
logarithm of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP); lnucct is the natural logarithm of user cost of
capital; lnfinconstrt is the natural logarithm of ﬁnancial constraint; and gov_indt is the level of
governance.
3.3 Methodology and Data
This study models the Nigerian domestic investment based on the Jorgenson’s neoclassical approach.
In line with the Johansen (1988) cointegration estimation technique, the reduced-form Vector Au-
toregression (VAR) of Equation (3) is re-speciﬁed as:
Xt = β0 + β1Xt−1 + .... + βjXt−j + εt (4)
Where Xt is a vector of variables;
X
0
t =[ l nrgdpt,lnucct,lnfinconstrt,gov_indt,lninvt] (5)
Cholesky decomposition is utilised for orthogonalisation, which means that Cholesky factor is lowered
triangular. Therefore, the domestic investment variable will be contemporaneously aﬀected by all
the other variables. The need to have a meaningful impulse-response function from the Vector Error
Correction Model (VECM) is dictated based on the ordering of the variables.
Based on the long-run relationship that is captured by the domestic investment model speciﬁed
in Equation (3), a VECM of the following form is estimated to reveal the short-run dynamics in the
domestic investment function.
∆Xt = πXt−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
πi∆Xt−i + εt (6)
The estimation procedure is as follows. Firstly, the reduced-form VAR in Equation (4) is estimated
and all the diagnostic tests are performed. Secondly, the Johansen cointegration test is performed
and the cointegrating vectors and loading matrices are identiﬁed. Thirdly, a VECM from Equation
(6) is estimated and the entire range of diagnostic tests is performed. Lastly, impulse-response
analysis is performed1.
Data were obtained from the IMF (International Financial Statistics), the World Bank database
(African Development Indicators, World Development Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors), and the Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin. Annual data series which cover the
period 1970-2006 were used to estimate the parameters of the model and, where appropriate, the
variables were transformed into real ﬁgures using the GDP deﬂator (2000=base year). Graphical
exposition of all the data used in the study and their order of integration are presented in the
Appendix.
Due to lack of availability of some time series data, the following time series had to be derived
for the variables used in the model:
1All the diagnostic tests performed are presented in the Appendix.
43.3.1 User Cost of Capital
In the absence of corporate tax data and a truly long-term yield, a proxy for the user cost of capital
was created through an exchange-rate adjusted (since most of the investments are from abroad and
an exchange rate is a signal to investors of country risk) prime lending rate of return. This is
represented as:
User cost of capital = (1 + interest rate)* nominal exchange rate
3.3.2 Governance Measures
The worldwide governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al (1999a) were utilised in this study
as a measure of governance. The indices cover a broad range of policy and institutional outcomes
for large number of countries, and include the rule of law, corruption, government eﬀectiveness,
regulatory quality, and political instability. These indices are also employed in Globerman and
Shapiro (2002) as a measure of governance. In order to capture governance in a broader context, the
average value of the ﬁve elements in the governance indicators is used as a measure of governance.
In addition, since the governance indicators series is only available from 1996 onward, and due to
the persistence of governance over time, the average governance score for 1996-2006 is used for all
previous years (Akanbi and Beddies, 2008)2. The governance scores ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, with
-2.5 representing the worst governance and +2.5 the best governance. Most of the governance scores
for Nigeria — and for developing countries — are in the negative range3.
3.3.3 Financing of gross domestic investment (Financial Constraint)
In a general equilibrium framework (i.e. system of national account), the ﬁnancing of gross do-
mestic investment equals total gross domestic investment (Du Toit, 1999). Therefore, the ﬁnancial
constraint variable is deﬁned as an identity which enters into the system of equations in the form:
Financial constraint = gross domestic savings + capital ﬂows + changes in reserves + depreci-
ation value
3.3.4 Rate of Depreciation
The rate of depreciation can take diﬀerent values in individual countries, depending on the structure
of that particular economy. In general, it is common to assign a higher rate of depreciation to
developing or low-income countries. A higher depreciation rate of 20 percent is adopted in this
study, since Nigeria allocates much lower revenues to maintenance expenditures (see Bayraktar and
Fofack (2007), Beddies (1999), and Vera-Martin (1999)).
3.4 Estimation Results
Based on the nature of the Data Generating Process (DGP) of all ﬁve variables, an appropriate
model for domestic investment in Nigeria is selected and the results of the trace and maximum
eigenvalue tests are presented in Table 1. Following the Pantula principle of testing which version of
the deterministic component should be used, the trace test identiﬁed one cointegrating vector while
the maximum eigenvalue test found no cointegration for a model with no trend and intercept in the
cointegrating equation.
2Nigeria had military rule between 1970 and 1996, with the exception of the period 1979-1982. Although these
periods features many instabilities (i.e. military coups and ethnic violence), there was a persistence in these insta-
bilities. In other words, there was a re-occurrence of these activities over time and the system of governance did not
change.
3There has been only a marginal improvement (if any) in governance since 1996, which is the post-military era.
These poor elements of governance remain the major features of the Nigerian economy since its independence in 1960.
5The long-run part of the VECM is presented in Equation (7). The long-run cointegrating vector
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All coeﬃcients are statistically and economically signiﬁcant and are consistent with the theoretical
speciﬁcation in Equation (3). The results from the core speciﬁcation conﬁrm that real output,
user cost of capital, level of ﬁnancial development and level of governance are highly signiﬁcant
determinants of domestic investment in Nigeria.
The real output elasticity is consistent with the existing literature and implies a huge positive
economic impact of an increase in real output on domestic investment. The results shows that a rise
in the cost of ﬁnancing domestic investment will lead to a fall in the level of aggregate investment in
the country, while the level of ﬁnancial development (i.e. stronger ﬁnancial system and availability
of credit) causes domestic investment to rise. The inclusion of governance performances, which
is the distinctive feature of this study, reveals that an investment in a more secure and stable
socio-economic environment will attract higher levels of investment spending into the country4.
The sign and magnitude of the governance indicator is similar to the ﬁndings of Globerman and
Shapiro (2002)5. This result is not surprising, since economic and political instability is one of the
major features of the Nigerian economy over the years, and is also a major deterrent to domestic
investment6. Table 2 presents the short-run adjustment coeﬃcients (α values or loading matrices)
which show the dynamic adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium path. As expected, the
α values from the error-correction estimates are all within a 0 to 2 range, implying that all the
cointegrating vectors enter into the short-run determination of Nigerian domestic investment and,
therefore, they can be regarded as not being weakly exogenous.
The positive sign of the loading factor in governance shows that it tends to push the system
away from its long-run equilibrium path. The domestic investment and user cost of capital variables
are found to be negative and signiﬁcant (tending to bring back the system to equilibrium), implying
that they play a big role in returning long-run domestic investment back to its equilibrium path.
The graph of the estimated cointegrating relati o ni nE q u a t i o n( E 8 )f r o mt h eV E C Mi sp r e s e n t e d
in Figure 2 below. The cointegrating relation is found to be appropriate since the graph reverts to
the equilibrium (zero).
3.5 Impulse-response functions
Based on the dynamic (lag) structure of the VAR, a shock to the i-th variable will aﬀect the i-th
variable directly and will also be transmitted to all the endogenous variables in the system. The
impulse response reveals the eﬀect of a one-time shock on one of the innovations on current and
future values of the endogenous variables. Using the othorgonalised Cholesky decomposition, the
impulse responses are derived from the VECM as presented in Figure 3.
4See Appendix E for robustness check.
5This conﬁrms that the governance indicator constructed in this study may be free from any measurement problem.
6Governance indicator is not in its natural logarithms due to negative values in the series (see the Appendix for
more details).
6Figure 3 presents the responses of domestic investment to a one standard deviation shock in
the exogenous variables. The response of domestic investment to its own shocks causes an upward
revision of the forecast of domestic investment over the 30-year period.
It is expected that investment spending declines as the cost of ﬁnancing it rises. The cost of
capital plays a signiﬁcant role in the determination of domestic investment, as revealed by a one
standard deviation shock in user cost of capital. This led to a permanent fall in domestic investment
over the 30-year period.
A one standard deviation positive shock from real output causes domestic investment to rise
over the 30-year horizon, while a similar positive eﬀect can be seen as the country’s ﬁnancial system
continues to strengthen.
The eﬀect of good governance has also been conﬁrmed from the response of domestic investment
as a result of a more stable socio-economic and political environment. A one standard deviation
positive shock in governance causes domestic investment to rise over the 30-year period. This
indicates the enormous role which good governance plays in sustaining long-term growth in domestic
investment.
This conﬁrms the importance of the variables included in the VECM in explaining the movement
in domestic investment in Nigeria over the years.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this study is to secure a theoretical approach for modelling domestic investment in Nigeria.
An augmented neoclassical (Jorgenson) approach was adopted as the most suitable for estimating
domestic investment, since it incorporates all cost-minimising and proﬁt-maximising decision-making
processes by the ﬁrm.
T h er e s u l t sf r o mt h es t u d yc o n ﬁrm that real output, user cost of capital, and the level of ﬁnancial
development are signiﬁcant determinants of domestic investment in Nigeria. This is in line with the
existing literature.
The distinctive feature of this study is the signiﬁcant role played by good governance in explaining
the long-term pattern of domestic investment in Nigeria. The results from the long-run estimation
and the impulse responses revealed the fact that a more stable socio-economic and political environ-
ment will boost domestic investment over the long-run period. The results suggest that investment
in governance structures will attract capital into the country (Globerman and Shapiro (2002).
These results have critical policy implications if an increased productive capacity and improved
future growth is to be achieved in the Nigerian economy. Therefore, there is an urgent need to
refocus the government’s role in certain critical areas of the economy. Government institutions need
to be more strengthened by improving coordination within government structures. The political
environment must be more secure in order to attract higher levels of private investment. The
maintenance of public order, the assurance of property rights, a sound regulatory structure and
the creation of a framework that will increase the provision of public goods and services, and the
maintenance of infrastructure, is urgent in order to achieve the set macroeconomic objectives.
Future research should attempt to correct some of the shortcomings of this study. The lack
of available long-term series on governance rating must be addressed, and this may give a better
parameter estimate of the eﬀect of governance on domestic investment.
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9Figure 1: Growth in Domestic Investment and the Ratio of Domestic Investment 
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Source: World Bank; World Development Indicators 
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Response of Domestic Investment to Shocks in Governance
Figure 3: Response to One Standard Deviation Shock Over a 30-Year Period 
11Table 1: Cointegration Test Results 
 
 
Trace Test  Maximum Eigenvalue Tests 
o H   1 H   λ -Trace 
Stat. 
5% CV 
o H   1 H   λ -Max  5% CV 
r=0  r≥1  66.38**  60.06 r=0  r=1 28.46  30.44 
r≤1 r≥2  37.93  40.17 r=1  r=2 23.72  24.16 
r≤2 r≥3  14.21  24.28 r=2  r=3 12.39  17.80 
r≤3 r≥4  1.82 12.32  r=3 r=4  1.39  11.22 









Table 2: Estimated Loading Matrices and Weak Exogeneity Tests 
 
Variables  
t rgdp ln Δ   t ucc ln Δ   t finconstr ln Δ   t ind gov_ Δ   t inv ln Δ  












Notes: t-statistics are given in brackets 
          : The likelihood ratio test for binding restrictions is LR = 66.38. The       
             probability of committing Type I error in the parentheses. This test refer to     


















































































































































































































































































































B. Order of Integration for all the Variables 
The univariate characteristics of the data was analysed using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests to establish the order of integration, since the actual data-
generating process is not known.  
The maximum lag structure that is used follows Said and Dickey (1984), who 
suggested a lag order equal to 
3 / 1 T . T is the number of observations, which in this 
case is 37 (years 1970 to 2006). Therefore, the maximum lag structure of 4 is used in 
the testing procedure.  
15Table B1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for non-stationarity, levels, 1970-2006 
 
Series Model Lags 
τ τ ,  μ τ , τ   3 φ ,  1 φ  



















































































*(**)[***]      Significant at a 10(5)[1]% level. 
a      At a 10(5)[1]% significance level, the MacKinnon critical values are -3.18(-3.50)[-4.15] when a trend and a constant are 
included ( τ τ ), and -2.60(-2.93)[-3.58] when only a constant is included ( μ τ ), and -1.61(-1.95)[-2.62] when neither is included 
(τ ). The standard normal critical value is -1.697(-2.04)[-2.75]. 
b   At a 10(5)[1]% significance level, the Dickey-Fuller critical values are 5.91(7.24)[10.61] when a trend and a constant are 
included ( 3 φ ) and 4.12(5.18)[7.88] when only a constant is included ( 1 φ ). 
 
The result of the ADF-test for all the variables used in our estimations is reported in 
Table B1. The first column shows the list of all the variables that are tested. The 
second column (model) shows whether the equation that is estimated for the testing 
purpose involves a trend and a constant (Trend), a constant only (Constant), or neither 
a constant nor a trend (None). The third column shows the number of lags that are 
used for each model and they are significant at the 10-percent level. The fourth 
column is the ADF t-statistic, called  τ τ  (for Trend and a Constant),  μ τ (for only 
Constant), and τ (for neither Trend nor Constant). The last column is the F-statistic 
3 φ  ( 1 φ ), testing whether the trend (constant) is significant under the null hypothesis of 
no unit root.   
From the result, it is clear that most of the variables are non-stationary [I(1)] in level 
form.  
 
16C. Reduced-Form VAR Diagnostic Tests 
All the roots have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. Table C1 
presents other diagnostics tests for the VAR. The VAR passed all the diagnostic tests, 
revealing a well-specified model.  
Table C1: Diagnostic Test on the Reduced-Form VAR 
 
1 H   0 H   Test Statistic  Prob. 
Serial Correlation  No Serial 
Correlation 
LM-Test-





JB-Joint 12.15  0.28 
 Error  Term  Kurtosis-Joint  4.26  0.51 
   Skewness-Joint  7.89  0.16 
Heteroschedasticity No 
Heteroschedasticity 
2 χ   215.75 0.15 
 
D. Vector Error Correction Estimates (Governance Indicator) 
 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates     
 Sample (adjusted): 1972 2006       
 Included observations: 35 after adjustments     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]     
Cointegrating  Eq:    CointEq1      
LN_GCF(-1)    1.000000      
       
LN_RGDP(-1)  -0.953554      
    (0.07343)      
  [-12.9861]      
       
LN_UCC(-1)    0.189700      
    (0.07238)      
  [  2.62087]      
       
LN_FINCONSTR(-1)  -0.165414      
    (0.06303)      
  [-2.62419]      
       
GOV_IND(-1)  -1.867154      
    (0.66970)      
  [-2.78803]      
Error Correction:  D(LN_GCF)  D(LN_RGDP)  D(LN_UCC) 
D(LN_FINCON
STR)  D(GOV_IND) 
CointEq1 -0.672564  -0.049062  -0.851318 -0.256759   0.011327 
   (0.22084)   (0.14878)   (0.25456)   (0.46083)   (0.05793) 
 [-3.04549]  [-0.32977]  [-3.34430] [-0.55717] [  0.19554] 
       
 R-squared   0.381814  -0.025478   0.416859   0.033094   0.038261 
 Adj. R-squared   0.249346  -0.245223   0.291900 -0.174101 -0.167826 
17 Sum sq. resids   1.747755   0.793238   2.322197   7.610388   0.120243 
 S.E. equation   0.249840   0.168315   0.287985   0.521344   0.065532 
 F-statistic   2.882301  -0.115941   3.335966   0.159723   0.185656 
 Log likelihood   2.784927   16.60929  -2.188245 -22.96075   49.62497 
 Akaike AIC   0.240861  -0.549102   0.525043   1.712043  -2.435712 
 Schwarz SC   0.551931  -0.238033   0.836112   2.023113  -2.124643 
 Mean dependent   0.052633   0.053043   0.153181   0.258146 -0.001429 
 S.D. dependent   0.288364   0.150834   0.342234   0.481140   0.060640 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)   4.73E-08       
 Determinant resid covariance   1.55E-08       
 Log likelihood   66.37763       
 Akaike information criterion  -1.507293       
 Schwarz criterion   0.270248       
 
 
E. Robustness Check on Governance Indicator 
 
In order to validate the long-run relationship of the investment function adopted in 
this study, a robustness check on the role of governance is performed by using 
alternative institutional indices which cover the period of the study. The average value 
of the combined political right and civil liberty indices (cl_pr), from the Freedom 
House Political Right Index (FHPRI), is used as a measure of governance. The index 
ranges from 1 to 7, with the low values representing ‘total freedom’, the median 
values ‘partial freedom’ and the high values ‘no freedom’. Higher values represent 
worse governance, which is a different interpretation from the Kaufmann Worldwide 
Governance Indicators used in the study.  
The result from this estimation (as presented in the Table below) confirms that the 
level of governance plays a significant role in the long-run investment decisions of 
firms. The diagnostic test shows that the trace test identified one cointegrating vector, 
while the maximum eigenvalue test found no cointegration for a model with no trend 
and intercept in the cointegrating equation. 
As mentioned earlier, Kaufmann et al (1999a) is adopted in the study since it covers a 
broader range of policy and institutional factors (governance) than the FHPRI.       
Vector Error Correction Estimates (FHPRI) 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates       
 Sample (adjusted): 1972 2006       
 Included observations: 35 after adjustments     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]     
Cointegrating  Eq:    CointEq1      
18LN_GCF(-1)    1.000000      
       
LN_RGDP(-1)  -0.806590      
    (0.05521)      
  [-14.6093]      
       
LN_UCC(-1)    0.085888      
    (0.09324)      
  [  0.92114]      
       
LN_FINCONSTR(-1)  -0.138839      
    (0.08750)      
  [-1.58673]      
       
LN_CL_PR(-1)    0.568668      
    (0.22671)      
  [  2.50830]      
Error Correction:  D(LN_GCF)  D(LN_RGDP)  D(LN_UCC) 
D(LN_FINCON
STR) D(LN_CL_PR) 
CointEq1  -0.467595 -0.111882 -0.717042 -0.626215 -0.061446 
   (0.15519)   (0.10176)   (0.19785)   (0.31391)   (0.16229) 
  [-3.01300] [-1.09944] [-3.62411] [-1.99487] [-0.37862] 
       
 R-squared   0.376723   0.020506   0.280779   0.084001   0.094131 
 Adj. R-squared   0.269262  -0.148372   0.156775 -0.073929 -0.062053 
 Sum sq. resids   1.762148   0.757669   2.864096   7.209700   1.926980 
 S.E. equation   0.246503   0.161637   0.314264   0.498608   0.257774 
 F-statistic   3.505656   0.121427   2.264278   0.531888   0.602693 
 Log likelihood   2.641403   17.41215  -5.858680 -22.01424   1.076544 
 Akaike AIC   0.191920  -0.652123   0.677639   1.600813   0.281340 
 Schwarz SC   0.458551  -0.385492   0.944270   1.867445   0.547971 
 Mean dependent   0.052633   0.053043   0.153181   0.258146   0.011585 
 S.D. dependent   0.288364   0.150834   0.342234   0.481140   0.250130 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)   7.39E-07       
 Determinant resid covariance   2.89E-07       
 Log likelihood   15.19801       
 Akaike information criterion   1.131542       
 Schwarz criterion   2.686890       
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